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Summary
This paper is an account of scientific transfer to, and co-development with, a 
commercial  organization.  The  context  is  that  of  safety  management  of  an 
energy  distribution  network.  A company  called  EnergyCo  approached  the 
authors about their need of an incident analysis method. The company wanted 
a  tool  that  would help  them better  capture  the  causes  of  incidents  during 
maintenance operations on their network. The expertise they particularly asked 
for was that of human factors; an angle to work analysis they valued but had 
not been able to deploy at the time.
Beyond the mere technical contents of the tool that was developed, we wish to 
provide an account of the various transactions, exchanges and collaborations 
that took place during the development of this method. We will highlight a 
particular angle of scientific transfer: co-development. In doing so, we will try 
to  convey  the  message that  scientific  transfer  goes  beyond a  mere  "push" 
model. Indeed, we are of the opinion that in the case of the development of a 
method for the industry, transfer can be turned very productively into a co-
development collaboration.
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1. Introduction
The authors have  been approached in the recent past by a French energy distribution company: 
EnergyCo. This company had just set a new safety target related to the operation of their distribution 
network. Within the company, top managers rapidly acknowledged that their ongoing approach to 
safety (essentially based on a technical analysis of incidents) would not allow them to meet the 
target. This opened the way for a drastic cultural shift: the integration of human factors (HF) in the 
analysis of safety performance. Within this shift, our mission would be to integrate HF within an 
incident  analysis  tool  in  order  to  facilitate  organizational  learning  across  the  entire  company. 
Because this tool was meant to be used by operational team managers without HF training, the 
challenge would essentially be that of transferring en encapsulating our skills under some usable 
form for the final users. This is essentially what the paper will describe. We will go through the 
process by which academia and industry collaborated with each other in order to fulfill a need that 
implied using science for  operational  non-specialists.  In doing so,  we will  set  the focus on the 
collaborative aspects more than on the scientific contents of the method.
The paper begins with a brief overview of EnergyCo's operations, followed by a presentation of the 
scientific standpoint proposed by the authors and accepted by the company. The paper then reports 
on the process of understanding user needs and requirements and moves on to a description of the 
development of the tool. Emphasis is given to the adjustments and compromises made to meet the 
needs of the company. The main features of the tool are then presented and a case study is discussed. 
As a concluding remark, the authors comment on the experience of transferring academic knowledge 
to a practical environment with the assistance of those who are the ultimate beneficiaries of that 
knowledge.
1.1. EnergyCo operations
EnergyCo is a nationwide energy distributor in France. Within the largest branch of the company, 
several thousands of people are involved in maintaining the distribution network, a task that basically 
obeys two main scenarios:
● planned  operations,  whereby  works  are  taking  place  under  controlled  conditions  (time, 
allocated resources, schedule, etc.);
● emergency  operations,  whereby  an  unplanned  event  is  happening  on  the  network, 
interrupting the delivery of energy to consumers,  whose number ranges from a dozen to 
several thousands.
For workers, a significant portion of the work time is spent on excavations, at the direct contact with 
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network infrastructures buried into the ground. The role of team managers is that of coordinators, 
especially when critical  works on the network implies interacting with public authorities,  safety 
professionals, the public, the media and so on. Although the activity of workers and managers is 
significantly different by nature,  all contribute to a mission that is very clearly identified by all: 
continuity  of  service.  Indeed,  energy  is  a  service  that  is  meant  to  reach  customers  without 
interruption. It follows that any energy loss in the network is dealt with carefully, with particular 
attention paid to how many customers would be cut off in the case where the network had to be 
disconnected for repairs.
Another particularity of energy infrastructures is that they carry a service to physical habitations. In 
dense urban areas, this is challenging working environment since the energy network cohabits with 
other infrastructures (water, telecommunications, sewers, etc). What is more, this mesh of disparate 
infrastructures is buried underneath roads or pavements whose topography changes along with urban 
development. This causes updates in the mapping of the network difficult, a point that is a source of 
problems.
Finally, as an energy supplier whose network is several thousands of kilometers long in densely 
populated  areas,  EnergyCo  cannot  monitor  all  the  parties  working  at  the  vicinity  of  their 
infrastructures, not check the qualifications of every worker from each subcontracting company. So-
called third parties are a source of mishap to EnergyCo managers since they do not always comply 
with company regulations and legal requirements.
The three features above, and their implications in terms of EnergyCo workers, subcontractors and 
the public, entice EnergyCo to thoroughly manage the operations that take place on their network. 
Historically, this management relied (at least in part) on recording factual data on incidents, and 
discuss potential causes within units, during informal "on the fly" meetings1. We now turn to a more 
precise description of the safety practices within EnergyCo units.
1.2. EnergyCo safety approach
At EnergyCo, at the time when the research team was contacted, a number of practices were in place 
that impacted on how precisely incidents were analyzed, how thoroughly the contributing human 
factors were captured, and how the gathered information could feed organizational learning:
● Generally speaking, human and organizational factors had not permeated the safety culture of 
site  managers  at  the  time,  thereby  causing  incident  analysis  to  focus  on  the  technical 
dimension alone;
● Minor  incidents  were  discussed  verbally  during  informal  meetings  within  local  teams 
scattered over the entire country;
1 A serious accident would trigger a formal procedure whereby a safety expert would be sent to the unit to analyse the 
case.
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● Tools that were used to analyze minor incidents were essentially computer-supported data 
collection sheets focusing on factual information about the case;
● The collection sheets were shared digitally across the company but several tools existed, that 
were home-made and did not contribute to the company databases;
● Only major incidents were analyzed formally with the assistance of a company expert, but 
relied on traditional tools such as root cause analysis.
EnergyCo's  safety  approach  is  at  a  point  of  change  with  the  incorporation  of  human  and 
organizational  factors  in their  incident  analysis.  At  the  mean time and as  a result  of  this shift, 
EnergyCo is also modifying their process of learning from experience.
1.3. Learning from experience
Because  analyzing  incidents  generally  aims  at  preventing  future  occurrences,  a  mere  repetitive 
analysis of incidents is not a productive answer. Instead, an organizational learning mechanism has 
to be put in place in order to systematically capitalise experience, communicate the lessons learned 
and influence future practices. This is the context within which the need of EnergyCo, in terms of 
incident  analysis,  took  place.  Organizational  learning  by  a  learning from experience  process  is 
composed  of  4  steps:  detection  and information  collecting  (knowing),  analysis  (understanding), 
formalization and capitalization (stocking) and sharing and reutilizing (learning) (Van Wassenhove 
& Garbolino, 2008; Gauthey, 2008).
Organizational learning (learning from experience) is mostly implemented in an organization by the 
means of a tool. Such a tool must be thoroughly conceived with a clear definition of the objectives of 
the  process  in  mind.  If  not,  there  is  a  possibility  that  the  data  collected  could  not  contain  the 
information  needed  to  satisfy  the  general  objectives  and questioning.  Too  often  in  industry  an 
learning from experience process is implemented by merely collecting facts with little concern for 
analysis and interpretation of collected information.
The conception of learning from experience process consists of the integration and articulation of the 
four major steps of the process. We were approached by the company to develop an incident analysis 
tool,  that  is,  step  two  in  the  organizational  learning  process  (“understanding:  analysis  of  the 
informations”).  Furthermore, the tool that was to be developed for EnergyCo was a “second level” 
analysis to investigate the human and organizational factors of some of the incidents or accidents. 
The first level analysis corresponds to a systematic technical analysis already in place at EnergyCo.
So EnergyCo was changing a fair amount of their organizational learning structure. Capturing the 
causes of incidents in a systematic way made sense,  especially when the latter was meant to be 
deployed nationwide across the entire company. It was just difficult, to us researchers, to integrate 
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one part in a process without having a general view on the objectives and the design of the whole 
process.
The company had acknowledged the need to know what to do with the data before collecting it. On 
that front,  a computer-based structure existed that would accommodate the data that were to be 
collected thanks to our tool2. Our job would then be to design a collection and analysis tool that 
would help EnergyCo capture human dimensions of incidents during operations on their network.
2. General approach and scientific standpoint
2.1. Understanding human performance
Our general approach to human performance (whether safety-related or not) is to understand work 
and to pinpoint the conditions under which operators performed their task. The assumption behind 
this approach ties back to the Common Performance Conditions (CPC; Hollnagel, 1998), a set of 
criteria  that  influence human performance.  The idea was not  totally  new at  the  time:  a  similar 
concept had been proposed by Swain and Guttman (1983) and coined performance shaping factors. 
The  philosophy  behind  the  CPC  is  what  underpinned  the  second  generation  accident  analysis 
methods: human performance cannot be reduced to an equation relying on a nominal failure rate3. 
Instead, it is the context in which people work that determines for the most part how well or badly 
they are going to perform on a given task. 
Table 1: Overview  of the 9 Common Performance Conditions
2 What this computer-based structure was composed of falls  outside of our scope and will not  be discussed here. 
However, we will touch upon the organisational learning loop and discuss the fit between the latter and the incident  
analysis tool.
3 The CPC are actually only one sub-set of an accident analysis and risk assessment method authored by Hollnagel: 
CREAM.
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Conditions Description
Adequacy of organization
The quality  of the roles and responsibilities of team members,  additional  support, 
communication systems, Safety Management System, instructions and guidelines for 
externally oriented activities, role of external agencies, etc.
Working conditions The nature  of  the physical  working  conditions  such as ambient  lighting,  glare on screens, noise from alarms, interruptions from the tasks, etc.
Adequacy  of  MMI  and 
operational support
The  Man-Machine  Interface  in  general,  including  the  information  available  on 
control  panels,  computerised  workstations,  and  operational  support  provided  by 
specifically designed decision aids.
Availability  of  procedures  and 
plans
Procedures and plans include operating and emergency procedures, familiar patterns 
of response heuristics, routines, etc.
Number of simultaneous goals
The number of tasks a person is required to pursue or attend to at the same time (i.e. 
evaluating the effects of actions, sampling new information, assessing multiple goals, 
etc.).
Available time The time available to carry out a task and corresponds to how well the task execution is synchronised to the process dynamics.
Time of day (circadian rhythm)
The time of day ( or night) describes the time at which the task is carried out, in 
particular  whether  or  not  the  person  is  adjusted  to  the  current  time  (circadian 
rhythm). Typical examples are the effects of shift work. It is a well established fact 
that the time of  day has an effect on the quality of the work, and that performance is 
less efficient if the normal circadian rhythm is disrupted.
Adequacy  of  training  and 
experience
The  level  and  quality  of  training  provided  to  operators  as  familiarization  to  new 
technology,  refreshing  old  skills,  etc.  It  also  refers  to  the  level  of  operational 
experience.
Crew collaboration quality
The  quality  of  the  collaboration  between  crew  members,  including  the  overlap 
between the official and unofficial structure, the level of trust, and the general social 
climate among crew members.
The principle behind the CPC is simple. They are used as a set of criteria to assess the conditions in 
which  people  perform their  task.  This  assessment  is  performed  against  qualitative  scales:  very 
efficient, efficient, inefficient, deficient.
In the case of EnergyCo, we suggested this approach since it matched their needs of understanding 
the so-called human factors at play during maintenance operations. The CPC also had the advantage 
of being designed as a set of basic work analysis criteria. This would ease their translation into a tool, 
a possibility that EnergyCo saw as an asset.
2.2. Incident analysis and safety management
Typically, at EnergyCo, an incident is an event that:
● produces unwanted outcomes;
● causes injuries (to EnergyCo employees or the public) and/or loss of assets;
● disrupts the continuity of service to an unacceptable extent.
In dealing with incidents, top managers at EnergyCo took the decision to manage human factors 
along with the traditional set of technical causes. The high-level objective was to capitalise on causes 
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of incidents,  both on the technical  and human factors  sides.  In doing so, managers  were of the 
opinion that widening the spectrum of the search for causes would also widen the spectrum of the 
cures to incidents. This is consistent with the following safety proverb:  What you look for is what 
you find, and what you find is what you fix. Indeed, to EnergyCo top managers, it was clear that 
concentrating on the technical dimension of incidents would only bring up more instances of known 
technical  causes without  increasing safety records.  And because the company safety record was 
plateauing for several years, only a significant paradigm shift would allow them to further improve 
safety performance. This situation is the very same one that commercial aviation is facing in western 
countries:  mastering the technical  design of  aircraft  and introducing crew resource management 
programmes in the 1990s lowered accident rates to some unprecedented level . However, statistics 
now show that the number of aviation accidents, although at an all-time low, is now asymptotic 
(Boeing, 2005), revealing that the philosophies and actions deployed over the past decades have 
come to their limits in terms of improving safety records.
Accompanying EnergyCo through their paradigm shift was our mission. This is where our human 
factors standpoint and the company's objective met. Concretely, this translated into turning the CPC 
into  a  tool;  a  development  that  was  undertaken  under  a  collaborative  model.  This  is  what  the 
following sections will describe.
3. Analysis of requirements and early specifications
This section is not a step-by-step account of a typical development project. Instead, we will focus on 
the phases were co-development was the driving force. Our intention is to highlight the contribution 
of both parties (EnergyCo and our team) to the method. Another interesting aspect is that any one 
party would have been able to produce some version of the final tool on their own. However, the co-
development strategy revealed fruitful in:
● saving development time, each party bringing their expertise into the development process;
● making sure the scientific  assumptions behind the use of  the CPC were understood and 
shared;
● capturing  the  reality  of  the  work  of  maintenance  operators  through  the  involvement  of 
EnergyCo former unit operational managers.
3.1. Understanding the need
In order to understand the needs and requirements, as well as the constraints, of the company, the 
research team conducted an assessment. This assessment involved:
● visiting a couple of operational sites and workshops;
● speaking to several people within the organization, including a number of local managers.
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As we did this, we made an effort to explain our approach, i.e., the importance of understanding why 
people do not perform as expected. Our assumption, as explained previously, is that the causes are to 
be found essentially in the conditions of work.
It became clear to us that the tool  should be able to quickly assist  in the identification of good 
practices and failures. In addition, the tool should serve as a first level of incident analysis, and 
therefore assist in the identification of incidents that merited deeper investigation.
3.2. Understanding the context: factors of adoption and rejection
Another requirement is that the method has to be simple because it is was meant to be used by non-
specialists. An important factor of acceptation of a new tool are the benefits that the tool gives to the 
persons who use it:
● gain of time/effort to do the incident analysis compared to other (existing) methods or tools;
● the  information  obtained  from  the  use  of  the  tool  should  be  useful,  i.e.,  lead  to  an 
improvement in safety;
● the tool should add value to the job and be a factor of motivation for the user;
The co-development is a way to assure that the management of the company obtains a tool that fits 
their needs (and a tool that is scientifically based), but attention must be given to the final use of the 
tool. The feedback of the learning process to the operational managers and field operators is an 
important step in a successful organizational learning process; without it the efforts of the persons 
who collect (and analyze) the information aren't rewarded and the long term success of the process 
can't be guaranteed.
3.3. Early specifications
From the 2 subsections above, we came to the conclusion that a CPC-driven method would match the 
above requirements best. Indeed, it would bind together several essential points:
● a tool that would make the analysis of incidents more systematic;
● an approach that would focus on human and organizational factors;
● a philosophy that would be based on the conditions of work;
● a product that would be simple and match as many as the acceptance/rejections factors as 
possible.
Other points mentioned by the company were:
● to introduce dynamics in the organizational learning process and to avoid methods that are 
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too complex to use
●  share information and experience efficiently
● a simple and fast method: no special skills are needed and no more than 90 minutes are 
needed to analyze an event
● the method must be compatible with the “level one” analysis that is based on technical factual 
data (see section 1.3);
As a technical answer to the identified requirements, the specifications were as follows:
● a set of analysis criteria derived from Hollnagel's (1998) CPC;
● a portable, cross-platform spreadsheet-based analysis grid;
● a simple quantitative assessment system for the analysis criteria.
A tool  can satisfy only two of the following characteristics at a time: simplicity,  generality and 
precision (Weick, 1999). In this case, the tool had to remain relatively simple and precise. The tool is 
targeted at the detection of human/organizational factors for the context of the working conditions of 
EnergyCo.  The general  approach of CREAM, which is rather  complex  to implement,  had to be 
transformed into CREAM-light, a simple and specific tool to the context of EnergyCo.
4. Co-development of the method
4.1. The co-development team
On the academic side of the project, 2 senior and 3 junior researchers were involved. The company 
participated with 1 engineer from EnergyCo's Research & Development Department, and 1 former 
operational  manager  who  served  as  project  lead. Although  the  company  engineer  was  for  all 
purposes responsible for the project, the presence of a person with field experience was essential, not 
only because he knew what would work and what would not, but also because he was able to open 
the  doors  of  the  company  to  the  academic  team.  In  that  sense,  he  performed  the  role  of  the 
“gatekeeper” described by (Lofland et al. 2006).
4.2. Scientific foundations
Hollnagel's (1998) initial set of 9 CPC (see section 2.1) stemmed from a cognitive view of human 
activities, based on generic classical psychological dimensions. This was both the strength and the 
weakness of CPC. Indeed, CPC were designed as generic and versatile indicators, and offered a wide 
range of potential fields of application. However, this also meant that before being deployed, CPC 
would need some tuning to mirror the exact type of activity performed by EnergyCo. Therefore, the 
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following modifications occurred:
● Renaming conditions. This was done to increase the ease of understanding of non-specialists.
● Redistributing conditions. Some of the conditions were not easily transposable to EnergyCo 
since they were heavily focussing on a very specific cognitive dimension (e.g.  Number of 
simultaneous goals). The condition was dropped, its underlying contents were renamed and 
eventually redistributed to other conditions.
● Adding conditions. The new set comprised 12 indicators instead of 9. The added indicators 
were Maps, Communication, and Third parties. This addition was very important to capture 
the specificity of operators'  work since EnergyCo is constantly using maps to locate their 
installations, communicates a lot between operational managers and on-terrain operators, and 
also deals with third parties who work on, or in the vicinity of their network.
● Increasing  the  level  of  detail.  The  new  set  of  12  indicators  was  given  44  subcriteria 
altogether, in order to adopt a finer granularity in the analysis of performance conditions, 
guide the assessment, and dampen the effects of individual interpretation.
The 12 indicators4 and their subcriteria5. are described in  Table 2 These conditions and subcriteria 
were  the  first  concrete  outcome of  the  co-development  process.  It  probably also  was  the  most 
important since it touched on the very heart of what aspects of work would be captured in the final 
incident analysis method. The fist phase of the co-development of the indicators
Table 2: Overview  of the 12 indicators and their subcriteria
Conditions Subcriteria
Work organisation Individual ● Team 
Working conditions Working environment ● Individual protection equipment ● Temperature ● Noise ● 
Light
Tools Fit to task ● Maintenance ● Tidying and layout ● Computer support
Procedures Task description ● Availability ● Updates ● Emergency ● Terminology
Maps Availability ● Structures ● Background
Workload Nature of activity ● Work pace ● Compatibility of objectives
Time management Work flow ● Preparation ● Pauses ● Regularity
Time of day Shifts ● Regularity of working hours ● Concentration
Training & experience Initial training ● Safety training ● Long-term training
Collaboration Workforce ● Awareness of objectives ● Team cohesion ● Versatility
Communication Language ● Jargon ● Redundancy of channels ● Transmission
Role of third parties Notice of work ● Compliance to EnergyCo regulations ● Foreman
4 From here onwards, we will use the term indicator to avoid any confusion with Hollnagel's seminal CPC.
5 The precise contents of each subcriteria are not described here in order to keep the table readable. A more precise 
description exists in the final tool, screenshots of which will be presented in further sections of the paper.
10
9th conference of the European Sociology Association, Lisbon, 02-05 Sept. 2009
4.3. Prototyping
Numerous iterations of the method, many discussions to adjust contents, adapt wording to end users.
Because time constraints were tight, conducting an intensive field study to capture the reality of the 
activity was not an option. Instead, a former operational manager worked with us in order to bring 
the context into the development cycle. Although not ideal, this strategy ensured that an acceptable 
compromise between time and ecological validity could be achieved.
We developed the tool with people who belonged to R&D and management. The latter personnel 
used to work within network management units and knew the job very well. That the co-developers 
knew the job was essential to producing a method that would be used. Because they were people who 
could have been the method users themselves, the development team had a very precise idea of what 
would be understood and what would not, what would pose a problem and what would not.
A particular challenge was to make sure that the scientific principles behind the tool were respected. 
This is because the development team, on EnergyCo's side, had a limited grasp of Human Factors 
approaches.  Thus,  the  process  of  educating  company  personnel  on  HF  was  taking  place 
simultaneously with the development of the tool. Conversely, the academic side of the development 
team had to learn about the specific characteristics of EnergeyCo's business, and in particular, of the 
risks its infrastructures faced and the means available to keep them at bay. The learning process took 
the shape of multiple in-loco and remote iterations, with both sides presenting their views and aiming 
at reaching satisfactory compromises when questions arose.
4.4. Keeping requirements in mind
Throughout the development of the tool, the team constantly went back to the list of requirements 
identified. Simplicity of use was a major requirement because we were well aware that the final users 
would have limited opportunity to learn about the principles of human and organizational factors 
behind the tool. This simplicity was to be reflected both on the design of the tool, i.e., what the tool 
would in effect do for the user, and on its interface.
5. The incident analysis tool
5.1. Presentation
The version of the incident analysis tool (IAT) that is presented here is the generic version. The final 
version is owned by EnergyCo and will not be presented here. The main differences between the two 
versions are about  the exact  subcriteria  used to to assess  indicators  and the use of  professional 
terminology.
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Figure 1: Screenshot of the layout of an indicator with its subcriteria and comments boxes 
(computer window and menu bars not displayed in this graph)
IAT is supported by a spreadsheet that hosts the 12 indicators, their subcriteria, a textual guide for 
the subcriteria,  description boxes,  assessment bar (this latter  point will  be described in the next 
figure), and comments boxes.  Each indicator has a spreadsheet page of its own. As described in 
Figure  1,  the page includes  the  indicator  label,  its  subcriteria  and a textual  description of  each 
subcriteria, a description box and an assessment bar. The spreadsheet is therefore composed of 12 
pages of indicators, each broken down into further subcriteria (see table 2).
This paper does not aim at describing the method in detail. Instead, it focuses on co-development. 
Therefore, it might suffice to say that each subcriteria is aimed at receiving a qualitative assessment, 
and comments if need be. The indicator itself (Working conditions, in our example) can also receive 
extra open comments in a box located at the bottom of the page.
Following  with  our  example  indicator,  the  task  of  the  incident  analyst  is  then  to  assess  the 
contribution of each subcriteria to Working conditions. To do so, the analyst selects an assessment 
option (Working environment in our example in Figure 2) by clicking in the assessment bar, and then 
selecting the desired option from the pop-down menu.
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Figure 2: Screenshot of an indicator tab with a pop-down menu 
showing assessment options (shaded area added for readability 
purposes)
Each assessment option corresponds to an individual score. Once all subcriteria have been assessed, 
the spreasheet then calculates an average score for this indicator, and then converts it to a centesimal 
scale6. The incident analysis process is a mere 12-fold repetition of the short procedure described 
above.
In order to provide the analyst with more than a series of scores for each indicator, the latter are 
displayed as a radar graph on a separate page of the spreadsheet.  This graph is composed of 12 
branches, one per indicator. Each branch comprises 10 notches where the indicator score is plotted 
(see Figure 3).
6 This latter scale is used across the 12 indicators of the spreadsheet in order to obtain comparable scores even when 
the number of assessments in not equal.
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Figure 3: Screenshot of a radar chart after evaluation of the 12 criteria
This graph serves 2 purposes.  First,  it  graphically summarizes the pedigree of a work situation, 
thereby offering a one-stop view of the state of the conditions of performance at the time of the 
incident. Basically, the lines of the graph that are close to the edges (high scores) depict conditions 
that are supportive of a high level of performance. Conversely, the lines that are close to the center of 
the graph (low scores) depict unfavorable conditions of performance. The second purpose for the 
graph is to serve as a transversal means of comparison. Indeed, EnergyCo wished to capitalize the 
analyzed incidents into a central database.  Radar charts would then then allow very fast, pattern-
driven comparisons across families of similar events. The image used during the development of IAT 
was that of a set of acetate sheets with radar chart on them, one per incident. Superimposing them 
would provide the analyst with a compiled vision of many events at a time. Reading cues such as 
global graph shapes or variation of line thickness (emerging from superimposition) would potentially 
provide a historical summary of scores of each of the 12 indicators over any period of time or data 
sample.
Last, a summary page that compiles all comments entered during the analysis and displays color 
codes that mirror the average mark received.
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Figure 4: Screenshot of a section of the 
summary page.
5.2. Strengths and weaknesses
At the conclusion of the project, a final version of the tool was delivered to EnergyCo. Below, the 
strengths and weaknesses of this tool are addressed:
● Co-Development: Co-development of a custom-built  tool,  as opposed to one just off-the-
shelf, helps ensure the the product is well adapted to EnergyCo's needs. In addition, because 
company personnel was directly involved in this process, a sense of ownership is created, 
which would otherwise be absent;
● Domain jargon: The language used in the tool – in the menus, in the help boxes, but most 
essentially, in the revised CPC table – is compatible with EnergyCo's lingo. This reduces the 
user's effort to understand “what the computer means,” and ensures that the analyses done 
with the tool are understood at all levels of the organization;
● Takes into consideration human and organizational factors: the tool incorporates human and 
organizational factors into data collection and analysis of incidents, which until then had been 
overlooked by EnergyCo. The tool, if effectively deployed and used, will assist EnergyCo in 
determining in what areas it must concentrate its efforts in order to improve safety;
● Easy  to  learn,  easy  to  use:  the  tool  is  built  upon  a  software  platform already  used  by 
EnergyCo.  This ensures that from a “computer literacy” point of view, users  will  find it 
extremely easy to find their way around when using the tool. A particular effort was made to 
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ensure that the criteria presented for assessment are explained in detail,  so as to prevent 
confusion;
● Serves as an “entry point” for a more detailed investigation: large-scale events  are often 
unique in nature and require the use of more powerful analysis tools than the one presented in 
this paper. On the other hand, not all small- and medium-scale events are the same. Events of 
a repetitive nature may receive a faster, simpler treatment. Because the IAT is intended to 
feed a database, it serves an added function of helping identify repetitive cases as well as 
unique cases. The latter can then be deepened with other auxiliary analysis tools;
Nevertheless, we must also note that the tool developed has some weaknesses, to which we now turn:
● The simplicity/generality/precision compromise: given the requirements of the project,  the 
development team prioritized simplicity and precision over generality. This means that the 
tool was custom-built to address only a specific type of event, namely, incidents affecting the 
company's distribution network. It is not in the scope of the tool to handle incidents taking 
place at EnergyCo's administrative buildings and workshops, for example;
● Cost in time: although the tool is quite simple to use, time will be needed to train users to 
exploit the IAT to its full capacity. In addition, some time will be required until sufficient 
experience with the tool exists for a discussion of the analyses to emerge. Finally, users are 
“practical people” who may quickly abandon the tool if they see it as extra paperwork added 
to their workload without any visible benefits. EnergyCo is advised to ensure that the use of 
the tool is rewarded with prompt action;
● Incident feedback: likewise, the research team has no information on incidents investigated, 
so  that  the  actual  benefits  of  using the  tool,  compared  to  EnergyCo's  previous  incident 
investigation tool, remain to be evaluated. As mentioned above, it is nevertheless important 
that EnergyCo makes sure that incidents analyzed with the aid of our tool result in visible 
benefits for the users;
● The analysis  is  meant  to  be  done as  a  group  (during debriefing  meetings)  but  this  can 
introduce biases on the assessments left: 
● It is possible to fill in the spreadsheet even if the data is incomplete or even missing: the 
major risk here is the temptation to complete only the easier sections of the spreadsheet and 
to disregard those which require more effort. The company will be able to detect instances of 
such behavior, but if it wishes to make sure that investigation meets high standards, it must 
provide workers with the resources needed;
● the tool only analyses human/organizational factors, no technical analysis: even though this 
was what we had been asked to do, we list it as a weakness. It would have been desirable to 
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promote an integrated approach that covered technical, human and organizational factors of 
incidents. However, the company believes it already has the methods and tools in place to 
handle technical factors.
6. Training, evolution and deployment
A small number of training sessions were organized for some pre-selected teams. Feedback was then 
gathered internally and some amendments were done to the tool. Namely, the data collection sheets 
that EnergyCo used for technical analysis (“level one”) were integrated to the tool. The idea was to 
enrich the factual and technical description of an incident. Also these collection sheets have been 
used for several years already. Therefore, it allows one to ensure some continuity between the data 
that used to be collected in the past, and the data that is handled by the new tool. The feedback we 
were able to gather indicates that users like the tool and are eager to give it a chance. From the 
perspective of the research team, this type of feedback is probably the most interesting output of the 
co-development process.
7. Lessons learned and recommendations
At the end of this account of scientific transfer, we wish to highlight what we have learned, and what 
our recommendations might be for researchers who wish to embark on developing methods and tools 
for the industry. We wish to do so to share our experience in priority with:
● academics, in order to describe what interacting with the industry might look like;
● researchers from R&D departments, who are meant to work with operational units from their 
own company.
7.1. Changing the method to accommodate operational needs
To the authors, the most obvious trait of EnergyCo's position during the co-development was their 
great effort to tune the method to their practices and existing tools. Some of their concerns were 
about the psychological terminology used, which in places had to be made less technical. Examples 
include the words cognitive, heuristics, interface. Also, some indicators of IAT were not understood 
as conditions of performance but as criteria of compliance to regulations. An instance of the latter 
was the Individual protection equipment. The latter was not seen as having an influence on the way 
work is done (e.g. gloves can prevent one from getting a good grasp on tools or objects) but was used 
to assess whether the equipment was worn fully or not. For this subcriteria, the assessment options 
retained by EnergyCo were a mere yes or no. Such a view can be a problem since it will not leave 
room to capture the reason why the equipment was not worn entirely (e.g. clumsy, uncomfortable, 
too hot, lack of feedback from objects, etc.). In the long run, this compliance-driven approach might 
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become a  factor  of  lack of  safety,  thereby  leaving behind a latent  condition waiting for  future 
mishaps.  This  clearly linked to top management decisions regarding the orientation of  the final 
method. Wearing protective equipment, when not complied to, was interpreted as a failure in itself 
and was simply not tolerated, although the idea that such violations have causes too was accepted 
(see Alper & Karsh, 2009).
7.2. Trade-off between scientific grounding and industrial wishes
From the section above, one might get the impression that scientific transfer towards the industry is 
sometimes in danger of being more about transfer than science. It is not exactly so. Indeed, when the 
industry adopts a scientifically-informed method or tool, they still have to reconcile constraints. To 
them (it  certainly was the  case for  IAT),  the choice  is  between  a less-than-perfect  method that 
everybody understands, against a perfect one that only a few people can deploy. Because of this 
tension, the temptation is great for the industry to adapt the method beyond what it can reasonably 
accommodate. The opposite temptation exists for researchers to keep the method unchanged because 
of all the carefully chosen pieces of underlying research. In hindsight, we stood as moderators. That 
is, we did not try to defend perfection but promoted informed adoption instead. We assisted the 
company in  finding a  reasonable  compromise between  a  method whose roots  would still  be in 
contact with some scientific ground, and yet allows its final users to easily achieve what the company 
wanted initially.
CPC had to be adapted to EnergyCo operations, which require intense participation of EnergyCo 
personnel. While the research team is knowledgeable about principles of human and organizational 
factors  at  work,  its  members  are  not  specialists  in  EnergyCo's  domain  of  activity.  Transfer  is 
therefore a matter of contextual awareness and transformation of knowledge. This did not imply any 
scientific breakthrough from us (as the scope of the project was transfer, not research) but needed a 
fair amount of explanation to get the concept of CPCs through, and demonstrate the usefulness of 
using working conditions as analysis criteria.
Conditions of  performance were  a totally  new approach to  EnergyCo operational  managers  and 
although  it  remains to  be  seen  whether  we were  able  to  effectively  “convert”  them to  the  HF 
approach, we are confident that we have at least raised their awareness of the subject.
8. Conclusion
Co-development can be fruitful for both researchers and the industry. Indeed, the industry is often 
pulled  forward  by  market-driven  operations  and  ventures.  In  terms  of  reflection,  this  can  be 
detrimental to long-term performance since little time and resources are set aside for the integration 
of new views and philosophies. In this paper, we focused on a new set of indicators for incident 
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analysis at EnergyCo but this rush-forward phenomenon is widespread in the industry and potentially 
touches any domain of activity. A striking aspect to this situation is that academia has the exact 
opposite problem: performance is assessed from publications, an exercise that focuses on new ideas 
first and overlooks industrial needs, and even potential application.
Our position is that the industry and academia have a lot of opportunities to collaborate that are yet to 
be discovered. On the one hand, industry has very interesting problems waiting to be solved, with 
limited resources to allocate. On the other hand, academia is a wonderful think tank whose outputs 
are vastly under-used. From this point of view, transfer is an intention to make these two worlds 
come together to produce a piece of knowledge or engineering that none of these two worlds could 
have produced alone as effectively as through collaboration.
One might now wonder why transfer might be such a good thing to do, after all.  A simple and 
immediate answer is that it can be good for society. In the case of our interaction with EnergyCo, it 
will bring a new way to look at incidents and hopefully decrease the occurrence of serious events. 
Beyond this potentially naive and maybe oversimplified view, transfer gives industry the opportunity 
to try new ideas without necessarily have in-house research force. For academia, transfer is a chance 
to see how research ideas and prototype methods get tuned and adapted and tested though real-world 
applications.
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